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RECENT DECISIONS
contain provisions whereby a lack of timely notice will be excused
under specific circumstances. Thus extensions are allowed where the
claimant was bereft of reason as a result of the accident 28 or where
the claimant has a reasonable excuse.29  In each of these cases the
claimant would be allowed to file within a reasonable time after the
disability ceases.
The instant case gives a more just interpretation of Section 50-e
than the previous decisions. However, it should be borne in mind that
the requirement of notice imposes a burden which is non-existent in
suits involving private persons. The municipality thus has an advan-
tage which is hardly in keeping with its decision to-waive immunity
from tort actions. Recognizing that the right to sue is statutory in
origin and may be surrounded by conditions, it is not doubted that the
municipality has the right to prescribe reasonable measures to protect
itself against unfounded or fraudulent claims.30 However, a notice re-
quirement need not be harsh or inflexible; it should be fair to the
claimant as well as to the municipality. It is submitted that a require-
ment that notice be filed within a reasonable time after the disability
ceases would not unduly burden either the claimant or the municipality
and would afford ample protection without impairing the rights of
either party."'
TORTS - CHARITABLE IMMUNITY - HOSPITAL NOT LIABLE FOR
INJURY CAUSED BY TECHNICIAN'S MISTAKE IN DETERMINING PA-
TIENT'S BLOOD FACTOR.- A blood transfusion had been ordered for
the plaintiff by her physician. A qualified laboratory technician of
28 See Ray v. Saint Paul, 44 Minn. 340, 46 N.W. 675 (1890). In construing
the city charter, the court said: "It is, however, also provided that notice need
not be given where the person injured shall, in consequence of the injury,
'be bereft of reason.'" Id. at 675.
29 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 2774 (Purdon Supp. 1954), McBride v. Rome
TP., 347 Pa. 228, 32 A.2d 212 (1943) (where the court held that negligence
of counsel furnished a reasonable excuse).
30 See Brown v. Board of Trustees, 303 N.Y. 484, 104 N.E.2d 866 (1952);
Sweeney v. City of New York, 225 N.Y. 271, 122 N.E. 243 (1919); 9 REP.
N.Y. JUDICIAL COUNCIL 227 (1943).
31 Several bills have been introduced to amend Section 50-e. Since the Joint
Legislative Committee on Municipal Tort Liability was established to study
such proposals, the policy of the legislature has been to defer approval until
the committee makes its final report. In any serious study of, amendments, the
comment of the original draftor should be borne in mind: "It is my judgment
that Section 50-e is sadly in need of a substantial over-hauling with a view of
a liberalization of its provisions in behalf of claimants against public cor-
porations." Prashker, Report on S. No. 3255, Int. 2986, introduced by Mr.
Gittleson, N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N COMMrITTEE ON STATE LEGISLATION (1956).
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defendant hospital performed a serological test, a necessary prelim-
inary to a transfusion, to determine plaintiff's blood factor. Because
of the technician's error in designating her blood factor, plaintiff was
infused with the wrong type blood and serious injury ensued. The
Court held that the technician's act bore such a close relationship to
the treatment prescribed by the plaintiff's physician that the hospital
was free from liability. Berg v. New York Soc'y for the Relief of
the Ruptured and Crippled, 286 App. Div. 783, 146 N.Y.S.2d 548
(1st Dep't 1955).
An employer is generally held responsible for the negligence of
his employees in the scope of their employment.' Massachusetts was
the first jurisdiction in the United States to announce an exception to
this rule in regard to charitable institutions.2  Jurisdictions that grant
immunity, in full or in part, usually have adopted one of four basic
theories: 1) non-applicability of respondeat superior; 3 2) trust fund; 4
3) implied waiver; 5 4) public policy." However, the rules of char-
itable immunity have "been devoured in 'exceptions.' "7 Some juris-
dictions which adopt the trust fund theory have allowed recovery
where there is property not exclusively used for the objects of the
trust.8 In other forums, recovery has been allowed upon a breach of
contract theory.9 The right to recover has also been based upon the
I See Ramsey v. New York Cent. R.R., 269 N.Y. 219, 199 N.E. 65 (1935);
Schediwy v. McDermott, 113 Cal. App. 218, 298 Pac. 107 (1931).
2 See McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
It is interesting to note that the court, in granting charitable immunity in the
field of torts, relied upon an English case that had been overruled some ten
years previously. Holliday v. The Vestry of the Parish of St. Leonard,
Shoreditch, 11 C.B. (ts.) 192, 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (C.P. 1861), overruled by,
"The Mersey Docks and Harbor Board," Trustees v. Gibbs, L.R. 11 H.L. 686,
11 Eng. Rep. 1500 (1866).
a See Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 33 Atl. 595 (1895);
cf. Bachman v. YWCA, 179 Wis. 178, 191 N.W. 751 (1922).
4 See Loeffler v. Trustees of Sheppard & Enoch Pratt Hospital, 130 Md.
265, 100 At. 301 (1917) ; Foley v. Wesson Memorial Hospital, 246 Mass. 363,
141 N:E. 113 (1923). The trust fund theory is based on the principle that
the funds are set aside for a specific purpose and should not be diverted to
pay tort claims.
5 See Wilcox v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hospital, 59 Idaho 350,
82 P.2d 849 (1938) ; Adams v. University Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S.W.
453 (1907).
6 See Weston v. Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul, 131 Va. 587, 107 S.E.
785 (1921); cf. Southern Methodist University v. Clayton, 142 Tex. 179, 176
S.W.2d 749 (1943). Despite the different names given the theories, public
policy is the underlying principle in all of them. Ray v. Tucson Medical
Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220, 223 (1951) (dictum).
7 Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
8 See St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n v. Long, 125 Colo. 25, 240 P.2d 917 (1952);
Robertson v. Executive Committee of Baptist Convention, 55 Ga. App. 469,
190 S.E. 432 (1937).
9 See Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915);
Parrish v. Clark, 107 Fla. 598, 145 So. 848 (1933).
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status of the plaintiff.10 Furthermore, considerations such as the com-
mercial nature of a charity-owned enterprise I, or the status of the
actual tort-feasor 12 have been held controlling in determining liability.
In two states where charities are immune, statutes give the injured
party a direct cause of action against the institution's insurance com-
pany, to whom the defense of charitable immunity is not available.' 3
Similarly the existence of insurance has been held to preclude im-
munity when the trust fund would not be damaged by a successful
action.'
4
New York has rejected the implied waiver theory and allowed
recovery regardless of the status of plaintiff.15 In the leading case of
Schloendorff v. The Society of the New York Hospital,'8 the court
declared a hospital liable only for the negligence of its servants and
not for that of its doctors and nurses. This immunity was based upon
the theory that professional people were independent contractors and
therefore the hospital could exercise no control. The concept of im-
munity later underwent a mutation, and the nature of the act, rather
than the one who performed it, became the controlling factor.' 7 Thus,
negligent supervision,' 8 defective equipment '" and negligence in the
selection of medical personnel 20 have been held to be sufficient grounds
for recovery. However, where the act is professional, non-charitable
20 See Henry W. Putnam Memorial Hospital v. Allen, 34 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.
1929) ; Sisters of Charity v. Duvelius, 123 Ohio-St. 52, 173 N.E. 737 (1930).
12 McKay v. Morgan Memorial Co-op. Industries & Stores, Inc., 272 Mass.
121, 172 N.E. 68 (1930) (operated a series of stores); Rhodes v. Millsaps
College, 179 Miss. 596, 176 So. 253 (1937) (rented part of a building as office
space); Pearlstein v. A. M. McGregor Home, 79 Ohio App. 526, 73 N.E2d
106 (1947) (operated apartment house); School Dist. v. Philadelphia, 367 Pa.
180, 79 A.2d 433, 435 (dictum), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 821 (1951) (engaged in
mining).
12 See Evans v. Lawrence & Memorial Assoc. Hospitals, Inc., 133 Conn. 311,
50 A.2d 443 (1946); Medical & Surgical Memorial Hospital v. Cauthorn, 229
S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
3 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-517 (1947), Michael v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity
Co., 92 F. Supp. 140 (W.D. Ark. 1950) ; MD. ANN. CoDE art. 48A, § 82 (1951).
1" Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N.E.2d 81 (1950). Contra, Cristini v.
Griffin Hospital, 134 Conn. 282, 57 A.2d 262 (1948).
'6 See Sheehan v. North Country Community Hospital, 273 N.Y. 163,
7 N.E.2d 28 (1937) (patient); Johnsen v. Staten Island Hospital, Inc., 271
N.Y. 519, 2 N.E.2d 674 (1936) (mem. opinion) (stranger).
16211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
17 See Phillips v. Buffalo General Hospital, 239 N.Y. 188, 146 N.E. 199
(1924).
Is See Santos v. Unity Hospital, 301 N.Y. 153, 93 N.E.2d 574 (1950);
Van Patter v. Charles B. Towns Hospital, 246 N.Y. 646, 159 N.E. 686 (1927)
(mem. opinion).
19 See Woodhouse v. Knickerbocker Hospital, 39 N.Y.S.2d 671 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd, 266 App. Div. 839, 43 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1st Dep't 1943).
20 See Howe v. Medical Arts Center Hospital, 261 App. Div. 1088, 26
N.Y.S.2d 303 (2d Dep't 1942); cf. White v. Prospect Heights Hospital, 278
App. Div. 789, 790, 103 N.Y.S.2d 859, 860 (2d Dep't 1951) (mem. opinion).
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hospitals 21 and private corporations, 22 as well as charitable institu-
tions, enjoy immunity.
The instant case, in marking one more act "medical" rather than
"administrative," appears at first glance to be nothing more than a
slight extension of the previously established New York rule. But
when considered in the light of recently decided cases, 28 the real impact
may be more correctly appraised. In Perlmutter v. Beth David
Hospital,24 the plaintiff was infused with diseased blood and suffered
serious injury. The complaint, based on a theory of breach of implied
warranty, was dismissed because the supplying of blood for a price by
a hospital is not a sale but merely an incident of an entire contract
for services to which implied warranties do not attach. Recently, in
Bing v. Thunig,25 the failure of a nurse to abide by the rule of a hos-
pital in regard to changing contaminated sheets was deemed not suffi-
cient to allow a recovery where burns resulted from this neglect.
"With the operation in progress and respondent under anesthesia, it
was not the duty of the nurses and anesthetist to interfere with the
operation by substituting dry linen for linen which might be wet with
some of the antiseptic, except at the direction of the surgeon." 26
In the instant case it is not clear from the opinion exactly what
constituted the negligent act.2 7 However, it seems that it may have
been an act which is objectively administrative in character-mere
negligent recordation of the blood factor which had been correctly and
scientifically determined. The Court, in designating the act "medical,"
considered it as essential to the over-all scope of the physician's treat-
ment. Since determining the blood factor was vital to the blood
transfusion, the causal relationship was immediate enough to warrant
the conclusion that the whole operation was medical.
Thus in the principal case we have a negligent act without lia-
bility which may be characterized as: 1) objectively administrative;
2) causally related; but 3) not concurrent with the blood transfusion.
The Thunig case carries the immunity further and includes acts which
are: 1) objectively administrative; 2) merely incidental; but 3) con-
21 See Bakal v. University Heights Sanitarium, Inc., 277 App. Div. 572.
101 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1st Dep't 1950), off'd mem., 302 N.Y. 870, 100 N.E.Zd 51(1951).22 Mrachek v. Sunshine Biscuit, Inc., 308 N.Y. 116, 120, 123 N.F..2d 801,
803 (1954) (dictum).23 See Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792
(1954) ; Bing v. Thunig, 135 N.Y.L.J. 9, col. 5 (App. Div. 2d Dep't March 6,
1956).
24308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954), 29 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 305.
25 135 N.Y.L.J. 9, col. 5 (App. Div. 2d Dep't March 6, 1956).
26 Ibid.
27 "We do not know in this case whether the laboratory technician made the
blood test negligently, or whether the blood test was properly made, but the
result erroneously reported by the technician or by some clerk." Berg v. New
York Soc'y for the Relief of the Ruptured and Crippled, 286 App. Div. 783,
786, 146 N.Y.S.2d 548, 551 (Ist Dep't 1955) (dissenting opinion).
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current with the operation. The shield of immunity before and during
operations is nearly complete, leaving possible room for recovery only
where objectively administrative acts are: 1) incidental and 2) not
concurrent with the operation. Thus, a person receiving a blood
transfusion in New York today must be prepared to assume most of
the risk of injury.28
Even if public policy did at one time warrant the doctrine of
immunity for charitable organizations, conditions have changed radi-
cally and the trend reveals a gravitation towards the just imposition
of liability.29 "With today's ready availability of liability insurance
it is difficult to believe that the satisfactory functioning of charitable
institutions requires a gratuitous license to kill or maim." 30 How-
ever, as the law stands in New York today, we are forcing the victim
of a negligent medical act to make an unreasonable contribution 31 to
the tortious charitable organization by a denial of a cause of action.
In addition to the consideration that immunity fosters carelessness, 32
charities should be required to be just before they are generous.33
The aberrational concept of granting immunity even when a charity
"does good in the wrong way," 34 is the creation of the courts. Re-
cently, opportunities have been presented to the New York Court of
Appeals in which it could have eliminated immunity. However, the
Court chose only to reaffirm its prior position.3 5 It then appears that
if we are to find any relief from this inequitable situation, it must
come from the legislature.
TORTS - FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT - GOVERNMENT HELD
LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENT OPERATION OF A LIGHTHOUSE. - Plaintiff
brought an action under Section 1346(b) of the Federal Tort Claims
28 A blood transfusion meets all the requirements of either the lay or legal
definition of an "operation." See WzBsTER's Nmv INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
1707 (2d ed. 1946); BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 1243 (4th ed. 1951).
29 See Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
This may be illustrated by the fact that both the Federal Government and New
York State have waived their exemption. See Federal Tort Claims Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1952) ; N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8.
30 Thornton & McNiece, Torts, 1955 Survey of N.Y. Law, 31 N.Y.U.L. REV.
344, 363 (1956).
31 See Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220, 226 (1951).
32 See Georgetown College v. Hughes, mepra note 29 at 824.
33 See 3 Scorr, TRUSTS § 402, at 2150 (1939).
34 Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
35 See Mrachek v. Sunshine Biscuit, Inc., 308 N.Y. 116, 123 N.E.2d 801
(1954) ; Bakal v. University Heights Sanitarium, Inc., 302 N.Y. 870, 100 N.E.2d
51 (1951) (no opinion), affirming, 277 App. Div. 572, 101 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1st
Dep't 1950).
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